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THE RECOGNITION OF STATE 









This study aims to establish why state crime is not always recognised as such. The 
criminological analysis of state crime is a fledgling field of interest, although over the 
past decade there have been significant developments. As a result of these recent 
developments it is possible to theoretically interact with state crime. Through 
theoretical engagement, within a real life context, the phenomenon of recognition of 
state crime is explored. A case study of the recognition of state crime during the first 
15 months of the Syrian uprising provides the real life context. An ‘adaptive theory’ 
approach is adopted promoting the flexible use of theory to examine the underlying 
reasons as to why some state crime is recognised whilst some is not. Appreciating 
that recognition of state crime does not occur in a vacuum, the context within which 
the Syrian uprising occurred was examined.  Recognition of state crime during the 
first 15 months of the Syrian uprising was then subject to investigation through a 
multi-level structural framework influenced by the state crime literature. Theoretical 
concepts from the state crime literature are also employed as an analytical tool for 
understanding the complexities involved in the subject matter. In determining the 
underlying reasons as to why only some state crime is recognised the study 
proposes an account of recognition of state crime. Finally, potential areas for further 
research are highlighted to establish state crime, and the recognition of state crime, 
as worthy of concentrated inquiry across the social sciences. 
 




The study of state criminality is a relatively new development within the discipline of 
criminology and has yet to receive prolonged and concentrated inquiry. Utilising both 
legalistic and interpretive definitions of state crime, numerous instances of criminality 
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arise. Despite the correlation between state criminality and the definition(s) drafted to 
encapsulate such behaviour, there appears to be a lack of recognition of state crime. 
This article aims to establish why there is inconsistency with regard to recognition of 
state crime. Therefore, the main research question is why are some instances of 
state crime recognised whilst others are not. A case study is employed to explore the 
crimes committed by the Syrian government during the first 15 months of the Syrian 
uprising, from January 2011 to March 2012. The insights provided by the case study 
facilitate the analysis of state crime within a real life context. Furthermore, 
engagement with the theoretical state crime literature has informed both the focus of 
the study and the construction of the analytical framework used to explore the 
recognition of state crime. 
 
1 Methodology 
Quantitative studies in the field of state crime are problematic as data is scarcely 
collected and often concealed by states (Ross et al., 1999). Therefore, a qualitative 
approach, in the form of a case study, has been adopted for this article. Case studies 
are the ‘foundations’ or ‘building blocks’ of knowledge within state crime literature 
(Rothe et al., 2009b: 7), and are an appropriate method of research for responding to 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions within real-life contexts (Yin, 2003; 2009). Keddie (2006: 
20) has described case studies as ‘an approach that uses in-depth investigation of 
one or more examples of a current social phenomenon’. There have been many 
criticisms of case study research that question its suitability for analysing social 
phenomena (Tellis, 1997a). However, Flyvbjerg (2006; 2011) argues that criticisms of 
case studies research, which question the methods ability to generalise, build 
theories and question the value of context-dependent knowledge, are over-simplified 
misconceptions. 
 
Layder’s ‘adaptive theory’ (AT) (1998) is used in order to assist in the construction of 
an analytical framework, capable of meaningfully exploring the recognition of state 
crime. AT is compatible with case study research and enables a more central 
integration of theory in the research process, which contrasts with approaches such 
as grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Crucial to AT are ‘concept-indicator 
links’, which can be viewed as theory-data links; these must not be purely 
behavioural (agency) or structural but a ‘bridging’ of both to accurately reflect social 
reality (Layder, 1998). Concept-indicator links encourage the use of ‘orienting’ and 
‘satellite’ concepts. The ‘orienting concept’ provides ‘an analytic unit around which 
coding and analysis take place’ (Layder, 1998: 113). ‘Satellite concepts’ are 




prominent theoretical constructs within the literature that are used to ensure in-depth 
examination. Utilising these concepts assists in steering the collection and analysis of 
data, generating concepts and theory elaboration. AT has been chosen for its 
flexibility and ability to link theory to social research in a manner which can expose 
the complex causality behind the recognition of state crime. 
 
Producing a case study research design is an integral aspect of producing effective 
research (Tellis, 1997b). A contextual analysis is offered to appreciate that 
recognition of state crime does not occur in a vacuum. Also, a multi-level structural 
analysis is adopted which, combined with the contextual analysis, forms the orienting 
concept (Layder, 1998). The structural analysis will consist of an examination of the 
recognition of state crime at international, macro (national), meso (organisational) 
and micro (individual) structural levels. The result is an embedded single-case 
explanatory design which uses multiple units of analysis to enhance exploration and 
determine causal conclusions (Yin, 2009). Every case study has a certain 
‘boundedness’, (Stake, 2005: 444), in this instance Syrian government crimes 
committed between January 2011 and March 2012 leads to an analysis of 15 months. 
Three central propositions are used to focus the study. First, the manifestation of 
recognition is not confined simply to two polar opposites. Second, a large variety of 
factors interrelate for recognition to transpire. Finally transition to post-recognition 
can only occur after certain actors at certain levels have recognised state criminality. 
Enhancing construct validity, external validity, internal validity and reliability is an 
important aspect of any research. This article has sought to use multiple data 
sources whenever possible. The use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis 
software, Nvivo 9, produced a database which served as an inventory of data whilst 
maintaining a strong chain of evidence. Furthermore, a case study protocol was 
produced to form a guide for the data collection process (Yin, 2009). These 
measures have been used to increase the validity and reliability of the study. 
 
A purposive sampling technique was used to identify the data to be collected. Led by 
the orienting concept (contextual and structural multi-level analysis), sources have 
been assessed on the basis of whether they are beneficial to understanding the unit 
of analysis, ultimately responding to the main research question and propositions. An 
analytic strategy based around coding and memo-writing was utilised to categorise 
collected data relevant to the orienting concept (units of analysis), ensuring that 
analysis remained closely linked to the research question and streamlining transition 
from collection to analysis (Layder 1998; Yin, 2009). Two analytic techniques 




suggested by Yin (2009) were employed, informing the reportage of the case study. 
A chronological time series analysis of the context of the case study is explored 
linearly, whilst explanation building is utilised throughout the multi-level structural 
analysis. The case study is then explored through the lens of theoretical constructs 
from the state crime literature (satellite concepts) to illuminate the theoretical 
implications. The recognition of state crime is then subject to examination utilising 
Layder’s notion of typology building (1998). Typology building possesses the 
advantageous effect of comparing variations of phenomena that assist in provoking 
theory generation and ultimately answering the research question. 
 
2 Literature Review 
This section will identify the central themes and issues within the criminological state 
crime literature in order to address the broader aim of ascertaining why only some 
state crimes are recognised. Crucial lines of inquiry will be examined and a partly 
overlapping dichotomy of the literature, based upon central themes and a 
chronological dissection of state criminality, is utilised. The dichotomy categorises the 
literature into ‘pre-recognition’, ‘recognition’ and ‘post-recognition’ appreciating the 
wider context within which recognition of state criminality occurs. 
 
2.1 State Crime Debates 
The lack of attention that state crime has received from criminological research has 
been widely highlighted (Barak, 1990; Cohen, 1995; Green and Ward, 2004). 
However, a steady development within the field has occurred as the topic is moving 
away from the periphery of criminological inquiry (Mullins, 2009; Lenning and 
Brightman, 2009). This change is demonstrated by the launch of the first ever 
dedicated state crime journal (ISCI, 2011). Defining the state itself can be a 
problematic prerequisite to research in this area. Green and Ward (2004) embrace 
Weber’s (1997) notion that the state has a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. 
This standpoint also recognises ‘proto-states’ who may control areas, impose taxes 
or employ organised force (e.g. FARC in Colombia). The actions of institutions with 
public power or coercive institutions are also deemed to be actions of the state 
(Engels, 1968). 
 
Being able to define state crime is central to the discourse. The two most prominent 
definitions are based upon harm and law respectively (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 
2007). Zemiological definitions based upon social harms have been advanced 
(Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1970), although Cohen (1996a) has questioned 




the value of describing an array of social injustices as crime. Legalistic definitions are 
dependent on the law(s) chosen, which may be either domestic or international and 
have the benefit of using the predetermined terminology of the powerful. In contrast, 
Chambliss (2011) demonstrates that legally sanctioned behaviour includes some of 
the most heinous ‘crimes’ in history and therefore criminology should define its own 
scope. Thus, one can conclude that criminologists are unable to reach a consensus 
concerning the definition of state criminality. However, this should not be viewed as a 
stumbling block as one may advance arguments whereby the example utilised 
conforms to both definitions. This approach has been embraced. 
 
2.2 Pre-recognition – Etiology 
Examining the causes of state criminality and the context within which instances of it 
occur is crucial to understanding the topic of state crime. Rothe and Mullins have 
sought to identify the ‘causal elements and their relationships’ (2009:114) by building 
upon the work of Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) and Kramer and Michalowski (1990). 
Their integrated theory draws on routine activity theory by identifying four enablers of 
criminality; motivation, opportunity, constraints and controls. Each catalyst is subject 
to four different levels of analysis; the international arena, macro denoting the 
analysis of the social structure or the state, meso which focuses on organisational 
level analysis, and the micro or interactional level which scrutinises individuals. The 
theory has been applied to explore the causes of specific instances of state 
criminality, thereby highlighting the complexity of the subject area (Mullins, 2009; 
Lenning and Brightman, 2009; Rothe, 2009). 
 
Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) also propose an etiological explanation of state crime 
deriving from criminological theory. The multi-level model produced explored the 
causality of state criminality and stresses the importance of analysing different 
structural levels, specifically societal, community, group and individual level analysis. 
One of the principle aims of their theory is to assert the irrelevance of individual-level 
theories based on solitary factors as an adequate explanation of state criminality. 
Instead, as their theory demonstrates, they support multi-level, multi-factor and non-
linear etiological explanations which appreciate the broader cultural, social, political 
and economic conditions of the particular state in which criminality occurs. 
 
The approaches taken by Rothe and Mullins (2009) and Maier-Katkin et al. (2009) to 
explain the conditions under which state criminality occurs have similar themes 
running throughout. First, the two conceptions attempt to derive substantial causal 




elements from the historical, political, social, economic and cultural tendencies of 
society and its structure. Secondly, both theories appreciate the numerous factors 
which interact with one another in various ways to create certain outcomes. Finally, 
both models recognise the importance of analysing on the basis of different structural 
levels. Highlighting the similarities behind these two theories enhances their related 
assertions, resulting in a stronger demonstration that the subject matter is inherently 
complex and can best be tackled when adopting a multidimensional explanatory 
method. 
 
2.3 Pre-recognition – Criminality 
A crucial criminological exploration of state criminality is Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger’s interpretation of the nature of crime and the criminal actor (1970). 
The authors argue that violations of human rights should be classified as criminal 
behaviour, thereby moving away from legalistic definitions of criminal behaviour. The 
1980s witnessed an appeal to address state crime from a criminological perspective 
(Chambliss, 1989). Barak (1990) observed a lack of progress and scarcity of input 
from criminologists concerning state crime and identified some of the core 
components of the literature such as definitional debates, the ubiquitous presence of 
state crime regardless of ideology and the significance of human rights. The 
importance of the conceptualisations of social control (Garland, 2001) and social 
justice (Schwendinger and Schwendinger, 1970) are also stressed. It has been 
purported that the discourses of crime and politics are thoroughly entwined; Cohen 
(1996a) highlights elements such as corruption, state crime and the criminalization of 
political conflict to illustrate this point.  
 
The complicity of states with regard to their criminality has been theoretically 
examined. Various types of state complicity in crime have been identified and placed 
within a continuum (Kauzlarich et al., 2003). In order of gravity, state complicity has 
been divided into; explicit acts of commission, implicit acts of commission, explicit 
acts of omission and implicit acts of omission, which form the typologies of state 
complicity. Instances of state crime have also been compartmentalised into, various, 
and often interrelated, types of state crime. A non-exhaustive list would include; 
corruption, torture, genocide, war crimes, terrorism (Green and Ward, 2004), crimes 
of empire (Iadicola, 2010), crimes of globalisation (Rothe et al., 2006) and 
environmental state crime (White, 2010).  
Case studies have been identified as powerful tools in developing understanding and 
explaining the criminality of states. An illustration of this point is the assertion by 




Friedrichs that the Holocaust should be classified as the crime of the twentieth 
century (2000). Another prominent case study within the subject area is Kramer and 
Michalowski’s exploration of the invasion and occupation of Iraq by US and coalition 
forces (2005). Ultimately, the authors utilise the Nuremberg Charter and international 
humanitarian law to establish the actions of US and coalition forces as a war of 
aggression and therefore criminal. 
 
2.4 Recognition 
There is a limited amount of research which specifically and effectively analyses the 
recognition of state crime from a criminological perspective. Stan Cohen has 
identified the political rhetoric of atrocity as central to the recognition (or more 
commonly non-recognition) of state criminality. Cohen (1993) investigates a ‘culture 
of denial’ permeating social and political structures, which is designed to conceal the 
presence of state criminality. Continuing research in the field, Cohen (1996b) 
analyses government responses to human rights reports demonstrating the 
complexity and array of factors which can result in full denial, full acknowledgement 
or the varying standpoints in between. A more substantive analysis of this 
perspective can be found in Cohen’s book entitled ‘States of Denial’ (2001) which, 
through analysing denial in a variety of ways, isolates the different manifestations of 
denial. Perpetrators deny knowledge of atrocity and/or responsibility because they 
were acting out of obedience to authority, conformity, necessity or self-defence. 
Further examples include the denial of injury, the denial of the victim, condemnation 
of the condemners, an appeal to higher loyalty and moral indifference. Official 
accounts which deny criminality tend to utilise literal denial (nothing happened), 
interpretive denial (what happened is something else), implicatory denial (what 
happened is justified), counter-offensives and partial acknowledgement. 
 
Another useful study concerning the recognition of state crime focuses on the 
methods utilised by states in order to exonerate themselves from punishment 
(Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005).  The analysis focuses on the notion of states 
‘othering’ perpetrators and victims as a technique of distancing themselves from their 
own criminality. For example, perpetrators are ‘othered’ through the use of private 
military firms whilst victims are othered by the territorial manipulation of jurisdiction 








Post-recognition – Control and Responses 
It has been argued that, despite the importance of causality, the most pressing issue 
in the state crime sphere can be located in the response to criminality (Ross, 1998). 
When analysing the control of state crime, academics tend to utilise Ross’ (1995) 
notion that controls can be separated into two distinct categories namely internal 
(self-regulatory) and external (enacted against states) control initiatives. 
Acknowledging this dichotomy, Ross and Rothe (2008) propose a third area of 
interest; the ‘ironies of controlling state crime’ can be described as the repercussions 
of the implementation of control(s) designed to halt state crime. The aim of the 
authors in producing such an analysis is to emphasise the significance of caution 
when adopting strategies of control. 
The relatively recent formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has made the 
120 states that have ratified the Rome Statute judicially accountable for their actions. 
However, the effectiveness of the ICC has been questioned.  The disparity between 
states which have and have not ratified the Rome Statute means that the ICC ‘risks 
becoming a symbolic venue for the imposition of a hegemonic political-cultural global 
order’, despite its unparalleled jurisdiction (Mullins et al., 2004: 304). Utilising the 
case study of torture and prisoner abuse in the Iraqi prison Abu Ghraib to form a 
foundation for the analysis of the effectiveness of the control of state crime, 
prominent state crime scholars have concluded that political and legal structures 
prevent the ICC from having the teeth to deter and respond effectively to state 
criminality (Rothe et al., 2009a). 
 
Post-recognition – Accountability and Reconciliation 
The ‘justice’ process that occurs after a minority of instances of state criminality has 
been examined by Cohen (1995). The underlying difficulty is deemed to be the 
conflict between reconciliation and accountability. On a philosophical level Cohen 
attributes this difficulty to the variation of moral reasoning processes, namely 
contrasting deontological and consequentialist principles. 
 
This literature review has unpacked the literature concerning different aspects of 
state criminality, creating a partly overlapping thematic dichotomy in the process. The 
dichotomy enabled the clarification of the recognition of state crime within its broader 
subject area. The themes and insights presented in this section directly provide the 
analytical framework and theoretical constructs against which the inherent 
complexities surrounding the recognition of state crime are critically analysed in the 
following sections. 





This section will examine state criminality during the first 15 months of the Syrian 
uprising. The data is examined through a variety of lenses which have been informed 
by the literature review, research question, propositions, orienting concept (analytical 
framework) and satellite concepts. A contextual time series analysis of the case 
study provides the foundation for the multi-level structural analysis, to explore the 
recognition of state criminality. 
 
3.1 Context of the Syrian Uprising 
The Syrian uprising began as part of the Arab spring, a series of leadership 
transitions in the Middle East and North Africa with protests across much of the Arab 
world. The Arab spring can be viewed as a revolutionary wave (Katz, 1999). The 
motivational factors leading to such wide-ranging civil disobedience are 
understandably varied and embrace geographically divergent ideological and 
structural concerns, such as poverty, human rights violations and corruption, 
although a full etiological explanation is beyond the scope of this discussion 
(Anderson, 2011; Bellin, 2012). 
 
In Syria, protests began in January 2011 producing localised and fragmented 
congregations of citizens striving for political reform. February witnessed an increase 
of protests being reported from within Syria, as resistance to the rule of Bashar al-
Assad’s Baathist regime started to become the fundamental aim. State actors began 
to clamp down on dissent, utilising aggressive tactics to disperse protestors (Human 
Rights Watch, 2011b; Human Rights Watch, 2011c; Williams, 2011). On 6 March 15 
boys aged between 10 and 15 were arrested, detained and tortured after being 
caught spray-painting anti-regime slogans. The societal reaction to this incident has 
been called ‘the spark that lit the Syrian uprising’ by media outlets (Macleod, 2011) 
and as the spontaneous catalyst of the uprising by scholars (Ismail, 2011). 
Consequently, anti-regime protests gathered more support, repeatedly clashing with 
security forces. The tone of the uprising changed dramatically on the 18th of March 
as thousands of protesters gathered in a number of cities, including Dara’a, which 
witnessed the first mass reported deadly crackdown on dissidents by security forces 
(Amnesty International, 2011b). 
 
Further protests and violence spread across Syria in March, with security forces 
continuing to arrest, detain, torture and murder dissidents (Amnesty International, 
2011d). Subsequently, ‘the challenge to the regime moved from local acts of 




confrontation with representatives of the regime to a nationwide uprising against the 
regime as a whole’ (Ismail, 2011: 539). These developments led to the most serious 
unrest during Bashar al-Assad’s reign (Aljazeera, 2011b). Since March 2011 protests 
have amplified despite the use of lethal force by Syrian state forces. The opposition 
to the Assad regime became more unified with the creation of several organisations 
such as the Local Coordination Committees of Syria (LCCs), which consist of 
networked local groups which aim to organise protests and report events from within 
Syria. Those within the Syrian Armed Forces encountered the harsh reality of 
enforcing the regimes deadly clampdown on dissent or face execution, resulting in 
many soldiers defecting (HRW, 2011a). One group of defected soldiers formed the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), whose ‘members’ are united by their aim to topple the 
Assad regime. A coalition of opposition groups and individuals entitled the Syrian 
National Council (SNC) was formed in August 2011. It states its aims as legally 
overthrowing the Assad regime, ensuring that the ‘revolution’ is peaceful, rejecting 
foreign military intervention and promoting a rights-based democratic system (Syrian 
National Council, 2011). Groups that support the Assad regime have also formed, for 
example so-called ‘shabiha’ gangs (League of Arab States, 2012) consist of plain 
clothed citizens who aim to disrupt protests and ‘operate on behalf, or with the 
acquiescence, of state forces’ (Amnesty International, 2011b: 5).  
 
Amongst the escalation of violence and the formation of increasingly organised rival 
factions the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, 
warned the Security Council of the danger of Syria sliding into civil war (UNSC, 
2011a). By the end of February 2012, it was claimed that more than 7,500 people 
had lost their lives, 25,000 refugees had been registered in neighbouring countries 
and up to 200,000 people had been internally displaced (UNSC, 2012a). 
 
3.2 Responses and Recognition – International 
Various actors within the United Nations (UN) recognised the crimes committed by 
Syrian authorities in 2011. The UN Secretary-General (UNSG) and the UN Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) both criticised Syrian authorities in March and April 
respectively (UNSG, 2011; UNGA, 2011a). In July, advisors to the UNSG highlighted 
the likelihood that crimes against humanity had been committed by Syrian authorities 
(UN, 2011). The UN Security Council (UNSC) condemned the Syrian government for 
violations of human rights in August (UNSC, 2011b). In September, the UNHRC 
published a report that recommended a referral of Syrian authorities to the ICC 
(UNGA and UNHRC, 2011). The UN General Assembly (UNGA) also adopted a 




resolution condemning Syrian authorities (UNGA, 2011b). Amid this criticism Russia 
and China twice vetoed UNSC resolutions, condemning Syrian authorities (UNSC, 
2012e). In early 2012, a UN Commission of Inquiry reported that Syrian security 
forces and officials are responsible for gross systematic human rights violations 
(UNHRC, 2012b). During March 2012, the UNHRC adopted a resolution condemning 
systematic abuses of human rights committed by Syrian authorities (UNHRC, 2012a). 
Furthermore, Kofi Annan was appointed as the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and 
the League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis producing a six-point plan for peace in 
Syria which received backing from the Security Council presidential statement 
(UNSG, 2012; UNSC, 2012d). 
 
The League of Arab States first condemned the actions of Syrian authorities in 
August 2011, calling for acts of violence against civilians to cease. Following this 
condemnation, Syria accepted an Arab League led peace plan in early November to 
stop violence and initiate dialogue with the opposition (Black, 2011). However, 
reports emanating from Syria conveyed a message of sustained violence (Chulov, 
2011), and soon after Syria was suspended as a member state of the Arab League 
(Aljazeera, 2011a). During December and January the Syrian government allowed 
Arab League monitors access to the country in order to inspect the nation’s progress 
pertaining to the accepted peace plan, the mission ended at the end of January 2012 
amid deteriorating violence and criticism of both the monitors and Syrian authorities 
(Urquhart, 2012). In February the Arab League called for a joint UN and Arab League 
peacekeeping mission (Muir, 2012), as previously mentioned.  
 
Other intergovernmental organisations including the European Union (EU, 2011; EU, 
2012), NATO, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and the 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation also condemned the actions of Syrian authorities. 
 
3.3 Responses and Recognition – Macro 
In August 2011 the political leaders of the UK, France and Germany released a joint 
statement condemning Syrian authorities and calling for Bashar al-Assad to 
relinquish power for the benefit of Syrian citizens (HM Government, 2011). The 
United States has also been critical of Syrian authorities. President Barak Obama 
(Bull, 2011), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (The Guardian, 2011) and US 
Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice (Rice, 2011) have all condemned 
Syrian forces. Russia and China have also condemned the actions of Syrian forces, 
despite having vetoed resolutions concerning the situation in Syria. Egypt, Saudi 




Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Iraq have all disapproved of the use of violence, 
detention and torture in Syria. However, the government of fellow neighbouring state 
Lebanon has stated its support for the Assad regime, and Syria’s ally Iran has 
supported the Assad regime through anti-western rhetoric and claims of assistance 
(Tisdall, 2011). 
 
Representatives of the Assad regime have offered an alternative interpretation of the 
uprising. Assad himself has blamed various actors and groups for the unrest within 
the country. Assad has linked causes of the uprising to foreign conspirators, satellite 
television channels (Marsh and Chulov, 2011), armed gangs and terrorists (Borger 
and Pearse, 2012), and al-Qaeda (Blomfield, 2012). There has also been a similar 
stance from Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Bashar Ja'afari, who 
blamed terrorists (UNSC, 2012b), and claimed that UNSC discussions concerning 
the Syrian uprising are in conflict with the role and responsibilities of the institution 
(UNSC, 2012c). President Assad’s considers Syria’s UN membership as ‘a game we 
play. It doesn't mean you believe in it’ (Walters, 2011), demonstrating his hostility 
towards the UN. 
 
3.4 Responses and Recognition – Meso 
NGOs have released numerous reports pertaining to the Syrian uprising. 
Accordingly, Human Rights Watch (HRW) have published a number reports. One 
report categorises the actions of Syrian security forces as crimes against humanity, 
implemented through state policy (HRW, 2011e). Another report concluded, once 
again, that the Syria government should be liable for crimes against humanity (HRW, 
2011d). In December 2011, HRW examined the violence suffered by protestors, 
determining that human rights abuses are the direct result of state policy (HRW, 
2011a). Furthermore, another report identifies the extent of extrajudicial killings of 
citizens by security forces (HRW, 2012).  
 
Amnesty International (AI) also published a number reports concerning the conduct 
of Syrian authorities during the uprising. AI’s first report argues that Syrian authorities 
committed extensive human rights abuses (AI, 2011a). Also, deaths in detention 
have increased substantially since the beginning of the unrest (AI, 2011b). AI has 
further claimed that the regime used intelligence agencies to monitor and harass 
critics of the regime in other countries (AI, 2011e). Syrian authorities are also alleged 
to have employed medical staff as ‘instruments of repression’ in the name of quelling 
resistance (AI, 2011c: 4). AI has scrutinised ill-treatment and torture of detainees 




through victim testimony (AI, 2012). Anti-conflict NGO International Crisis Group 
(ICG) released a series of reports portraying a brutal regime which systematically 
violates various human rights through its institutions (ICG, 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 
2012a; 2012b; 2012c). Various NGOs including AI (UNGA, 2011c), UN Watch 
(UNGA, 2011e) and the Cairo Institute of Human Rights (UNGA, 2011d) have 
communicated their opinions regarding the Syrian government’s human rights 
violations to the UNHRC. 
 
3.5 Responses and Recognition – Micro 
Individual level recognition of state crime during the uprising is especially important. It 
is argued that the reaction to the ill-treatment of the group of boys, as previously 
mentioned, had come to be viewed as illegitimate in the wider context of the Arab 
spring. As demonstrations grew in stature, security forces utilised deadly force 
thereby galvanising the protesters. This galvanisation process continued as security 
forces fired live ammunition at a funeral (Batty, 2011) and shelled various cities 
(Macleod and Flamand, 2011), provoking the notion that the government is an 
illegitimate entity.  
 
The role of media, technology and social media has also strengthened opposition to 
the Syrian government. Certain media outlets based in the Arab world, such as 
Aljazeera, are independent and less hegemonic than their rivals, often broadcasting 
dissidents and issues of human rights (Herb, 2011). The development of the internet, 
and the technology required to access it, has strengthened the prominence of social 
media. The role of social media in the Arab Spring has been analysed and is deemed 
particularly influential during times of unrest (Ghannam, 2011; Howard et al., 2011). 
Consequently it can be argued that the increased magnitude of individual recognition 
of state crime in Syria can be associated with notions of illegitimacy, strengthened by 
mass media, technology and social media. 
 
3.6 Analysis  
Theoretical constructs (satellite concepts) from the literature are now applied to the 
case study. Using a zemiological or legalistic definition, the actions of the Syrian 
authorities can be classified as state crime. The behaviour of the Syrian government 
falls within the criminal conduct specified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute (UN, 1998). 
The systematic use of state crime as policy, positions the high-ranking members of 
the Assad regime in the most severe conceptualisation of state complicity (Kauzlarich 
et al., 2003). Officials have used a combination of implicatory and interpretive denial 




(Cohen, 2001), in combination with ‘othering’ perpetrators and victims, to absolve 
responsibility (Jamieson and McEvoy, 2005). The uprising has resulted in the 
introduction of external controls that have yet to evidence a positive impact upon the 
criminality of the Syrian state (Ross and Rothe, 2008).  
 
The contextual and multi-level analysis of recognition of Syrian state crime during the 
first 15 months of the uprising has identified a broad model of how recognition of 
state crime develops. Context was the essential element in the selected case study, 
as it informed recognition of state crime at the various structural levels. For example, 
at the micro level the Arab spring provided the context within which many Syrian 
citizens, who had been denied human rights for their entire lives, initiated an uprising. 
The first proposition stated that there is a spectrum of recognition along which 
various typologies can be constructed. Examination of the case study has shown that 
various levels of recognition of state crime can be organised typologically. ‘Non-
recognition’ relates to denial (Cohen, 2001) and ‘othering’ (Jamieson and McEvoy, 
2005). ‘Passive recognition’ involves the condemnation of alleged state criminality. 
‘Active recognition’ concerns the attempt to bring a halt to criminality, for instance the 
external controls imposed upon Syria by the Arab League. Lastly ‘full recognition’ can 
be viewed as the attempt by various actors, with differing influence, to do everything 
within their authority to cease the criminality of states. It must be noted that these 
typologies may be utilised legitimately or illegitimately by actors.  
 
The second proposition asserts that a vast array of factors interconnect to produce 
the context within which various types of recognition of state crime transpire. These 
factors are, among others, political, geographical, ideological, economic and 
religious. Therefore prominent concepts such as geopolitics, control, power and 
hegemony are key factors influencing the recognition of state crime. 
 
The third proposition stated that the transition from the recognition of state criminality 
to the post-recognition phase is a gradual process, dependent on the types of 
recognition at different structural levels. Due to the timing of this study, the length of 
the ongoing criminality of the Syrian state is uncertain and post-recognition has not 
occurred, however widespread recognition has occurred. To analyse an ongoing 
case at this intersection demonstrates that in Syria recognition has largely occurred 
at the micro, meso, macro and international level, but still post-recognition has not 
been realised.  
 




This section has sought to ascertain why only some state crimes are recognised. To 
achieve this aim the case study of Syrian state criminality during the Syrian uprising 
was analysed through an analytical framework and theoretical concepts, informed by 
the state crime literature. A multi-level structural analysis of the case study 
highlighted the varied nature of recognition of state crime. Case study analysis 
stressed the importance of context, which is pivotal in determining whether 
recognition of state crime will ensue. Furthermore, the analysis of the propositions to 
the findings of the case study demonstrated the influence of context in shaping the 
array of factors and notions which impact upon recognition, among the various 
structural levels investigated.  
 
Conclusion 
This study has sought to determine why state crimes are not always recognised as 
such. In order to respond to this research aim the case study of Syrian state 
criminality during the first 15 months of the Syrian uprising was selected. The case 
study methodology was informed by the state crime literature and was integrated with 
adaptive theory to analyse recognition of state crime. A multidimensional explanatory 
method was utilised to investigate the recognition of state crime. The analytic 
framework consisting of a contextual time series analysis, combined with a multi-level 
structural analysis, illuminated the issue of the recognition of state crime within a real 
life context, whilst simultaneously appreciating the underlying complexity of the 
subject area. Furthermore, the use of three propositions relating to issues raised by 
the literature review proved to be advantageous in focusing the scope of the study. 
A literature review was conducted to explore the main themes and concepts present 
within the criminological state crime literature. The use of a thematic dichotomy 
facilitated the compartmentalisation of the state crime literature into three constructed 
phases – pre-recognition, recognition, and post-recognition – thereby acknowledging 
the need to situate the recognition of state crime within its broader subject area. The 
most prominent issues arising from the literature review were the complexity of the 
state crime, the benefit of typology building, the situation of recognition within the 
broader topic of state crime and the multi-level analysis required to adequately 
explore the research question. 
 
Analysis of the case study demonstrated the importance of context as the main 
underlying foundation upon which complex interrelating factors influence the multiple 
structural levels at which recognition of state crime can occur. The analysis 
responded to the research aim by employing a variety of theoretical, conceptual and 




analytical constructs relevant to the research area, in order to examine an alternative 
interpretation of the topic which appreciates the organic nature of the recognition 
phase of state crime. Examining the context of the Syrian uprising, as well as the 
recognition of state crime at international, macro, meso and micro structural levels, 
formulated the arrangement of the analysis. Furthermore, assessment of the 
propositions revealed different types of recognition, a myriad of factors influencing 
recognition and the uncertainty of recognition developing into post-recognition.  
However, the main conclusion emanating from the study is the need for further 
research. Multidisciplinary studies would be particularly useful in order to harness 
insight from across the social sciences. The stimulus provided by interacting with 
concepts such as power, control, legitimacy, hegemony and geopolitics would 
positively advance the study of state criminality. Future research, embracing these 
concepts, should focus upon contextual and interrelating factors to inform a more 
complete understanding of the processes and underlying notions present in the 
recognition of state criminality.  
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